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MORAL OUTRAGE PORN
C. Thi Nguyen and Bekka Williams
ost academic discussion about pornography has focused on the 
term in its, shall we say, classical use: pornography of a sexual nature. 
But right under the nose of the academic discussion, a secondary us-
age has evolved. Examples include, but are not limited to, “food porn,” “closet 
porn,” and “real estate porn.” This usually refers to photographs (but also some-
times films and textual descriptions) of exquisitely prepared food, carefully 
arranged closets, and beautifully decorated apartments and homes. These rep-
resentations are typically found and consumed via magazines and online sites 
dedicated to such images. Often, these images are of the kind of thing we would 
rarely be willing or able to get for ourselves, like photographs of meals at vastly 
expensive restaurants or airy Manhattan apartments far out of our economic 
grasp. Sometimes, these images are of things that we can obtain, but feel vaguely 
guilty about consuming—such as glistening, artery-clogging burgers. In other 
cases, they are perfectly ordinary things, but we enjoy looking at pictures of 
them anyway for some reason: close-up photos of a juicy steak or interior shots 
of other beautiful houses in our neighborhood that we could have purchased, 
but did not.
Perhaps this usage began as a metaphor or a joke, but it has quickly come 
to have a life and meaning of its own. Consider: we could introduce a new ap-
plication of the term without further explanation and anybody who trafficked 
in modern colloquialisms would know exactly what we meant. For example, “I 
was up late last night looking at headphone porn,” or “Have you seen that new 
site of high-end Japanese raw denim? Great fading porn,” or “I’m feeling sad. 
Everybody please cover my Facebook with baking porn.”1 More importantly, we 
think this neologism captures something very important about the way that we 
sometimes relate to, and use, representations. The usage, we suggest, adapts a 
1 In a 2018 episode, Saturday Night Live opened with comic Alex Moffat (in the guise of An-
derson Cooper) referencing “impeachment porn”—an utterly new usage, but one that was 
immediately comprehensible (season 43, episode 16, aired March 3, 2018).
M
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part of the traditional concept of pornography—a part that is conceptually sep-
arable from sexuality. In using representations as sexual pornography, food porn, 
or real estate porn, we usually have no intention of engaging with the conveyed 
content of the representation. When we engage with pornography as such, we 
are not aiming to actually seek out sex with the porn star, actually go to that 
restaurant, or actually buy that house. Rather, we are using the representation 
itself for immediate gratification.
The first task of this paper, then, is to offer a conceptual analysis of this new 
use of “porn” in the generic sense. Our account will be, loosely, that a represen-
tation is used as generic porn when it is engaged with for the sake of a gratify-
ing reaction, freed from the usual costs and consequences of engaging with the 
represented content. We can engage with sexual pornography without the need 
to find and engage with a sex partner; we can engage with food porn without 
worrying about the cost or health consequences; we can engage with real estate 
porn without having to clean and maintain all that spotless gleaming wood. Our 
claim is not specifically about the nature of sexual pornography, nor are we at-
tempting to claim any new insight into that concept. Rather, we think the new 
generic usage has seized on a usefully exportable part of the cluster of ideas that 
surrounds sexual pornography, and cleaved it off. This conceptual analysis of 
generic porn is useful, we take it, because it draws our focus to a distinctive form 
of relationship that we have with certain representations.
The use of generic porn is not necessarily problematic, and many forms of 
such gratification are harmless. For example, C. Thi Nguyen’s spouse has a par-
ticular affection for something she calls “organization porn,” exemplified by the 
Things Organized Neatly page on Tumblr—a page full of an endless succession 
of images of pleasing organization, such as a thousand colored pencils arranged 
perfectly by shade, or a pile of oddly shaped pieces of wood stacked into a per-
fect square. She says that such images calm her down immediately when she is 
feeling overwhelmed by anxiety and the chaos of her life. We take it as a datum 
that her use of this site is, at least in the moral sense, unproblematic. But we think 
some specific types of generic porn are problematic—epistemically, morally, or 
both.
We will further demonstrate the usefulness of the concept of generic porn 
by using it to isolate another type of such porn, which has not yet been singled 
out: moral outrage porn. Moral outrage porn, as we understand it, is representa-
tions of moral outrage engaged with primarily for the sake of the resulting grat-
ification, freed from the usual costs and consequences of engaging with mor-
ally outrageous content. The gratifications might include, among other things, 
a sense of moral superiority or smugness, the comforting sense of clarity that 
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arises from moral certainty, and the sheer pleasure of the feeling of outrage it-
self.2 We suspect that a significant amount of the activity on Facebook, Twitter, 
and other forms of social media might plausibly count as moral outrage porn, 
as does much of the content on many partisan news outlets. We will also argue 
that moral outrage porn is potentially more dangerous than other sorts of ge-
neric porn. Some kinds of porn are mechanistic—that is, they bring about their 
gratifications without requiring that their user engage in any sort of belief or be-
lief-like states. Food porn, real estate porn, and many uses of sexual pornography 
are mechanistic in this way. But moral outrage porn is non-mechanistic; it is an 
essentially cognitive form of porn. One must engage in a belief, or belief-like 
state—a state of judging something to be morally bad, or something very much 
like this—in order to acquire the desired gratification. And this use, we will ar-
gue, is a bad thing, other things being equal. Let us be clear: our purpose here is 
not to condemn the use of moral outrage in moral and political discourse. Moral 
outrage is essential, when it proceeds from nuanced moral engagement, leads to 
moral action, and is aimed at the genuinely morally outrageous. Our goal here is 
to distinguish such authentic engagements with moral outrage from the use of 
moral outrage porn. Moral outrage porn, we will suggest, invites its users to seek 
simplified moral representations of the world, and to simplify their own moral 
beliefs in order to maximize the gratifications of outrage.
Finally, we offer a unified account of why some uses of porn seem benign 
while others seem deeply problematic. Using porn involves a particular form of 
instrumentalization of the porn itself. It may also encourage users to instrumen-
talize the kinds of real-world objects represented in the porn. Using porn is prob-
lematic when those sorts of instrumentalizations are problematic. When such 
instrumentalization is harmless, then using porn is (other things being equal) 
harmless. Using food porn is harmless because there is nothing wrong with in-
strumentalizing representations of food or food itself. On the other hand, there 
is something very wrong with instrumentalizing morally rich descriptions of the 
world.
2 One set of representations often described as “revenge porn” is like this. Consider, for ex-
ample, the use of the term revenge porn in discussions of recent complaints against comic 
Aziz Ansari. (See, for example, Abcarian, “Is Aziz Ansari a Victim of ‘Revenge Porn’ or a 
Perpetrator?”; Flanagan, “The Humiliation of Aziz Ansari”; and Ham, “Ansari Isn’t the First 
Victim of #MeToo Revenge Porn, but He Should Be the Last.”) Please note, however, that 
we are not discussing another common use of the term revenge porn, where this describes 
dissemination of sexual images of a prior partner for purposes of revenge/embarrassment. 
(Instances of the two usages can overlap, but they typically do not.)
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1. Pornography and Generic Porn
Let us first establish some terminologies of convenience. We will reserve the 
term pornography for the traditional, sexual usage and use porn to refer to our 
new, generic sense.3 Let us start by charting some uses of this newer sense of 
“porn.” “Food porn” seems to be among the earliest usages of the generic sense 
of “porn,” and the usage is now quite widespread. Consider, for example, the 
site FoodPornDaily—subtitled “click, drool, repeat.”4 The main page of the site 
consists of single large close-up shots of food, like juicy fruit cobblers or ex-
tra-cheesy nachos. The user stares at the picture for a while, and, at their leisure, 
clicks on it, which immediately refreshes the page with another randomly select-
ed close-up shot of food. Though the use of “porn” in this case may contain a bit 
of self-mockery or a self-admission of guilt, the usage is not typically condemna-
tory, as can be gathered by the gleeful self-identification of many food porn fans 
as such. Similar openly acknowledged usages of porn, under that very term, can 
be easily found for real estate porn, closet porn, cabin porn, and various kinds 
of fashion porn.
Other uses are more condemnatory. For example, the term “poverty porn” 
has come to be used for a certain indulgent use of images and stories of poverty. 
Here is an example and explanation from recent journalism:
In case you hadn’t noticed, poverty is entertaining. “Poverty porn” refers 
to both Westerners’ portrayal of global inequality, and also to the distort-
ed presentation of disadvantage by the advantaged. Like mainstream sex-
ual porn that produces sexualised images from the male gaze for male 
gratification, poverty porn produces objectifying images of the poor 
through a privileged gaze for privileged gratification.5
Similarly, pictures of urban decay have been called, in a critical mood, “ruin 
porn.” Again, from recent journalism:
“Ruin porn” is based purely on aesthetics and is almost always devoid of 
people. Employing the mismatched spoils of history, ruin porn ignores 
and overwrites the voices of those who still call Detroit home. When 
its ruins are fetishised as art, these injustices are, at best, ignored, and, at 
3 We in no way mean to claim here that these usages perfectly track natural usages; we intro-
duce them for the sake of writerly brevity.
4 FoodPornDaily, http://foodporndaily.com/.
5 Threadgold, “‘Struggle Street’ Is Poverty Porn with an Extra Dose of Class Racism.”
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worst, mimicked. They ignore the humanity of residents’ current strug-
gles, while replicating the history that created them.6
But, one might ask, why call it porn at all? The suggestions from both journalis-
tic sources recorded above are remarkably harmonious. Ruin porn and poverty 
porn are exploitative presentations of impoverished people and ruined cities, 
used for some sort of gratification. The parallel to traditional accounts of sexual 
pornography is, at least in broad outlines, obvious.
Notice that the quoted discussion of “poverty porn” invokes the notion of 
objectification—well-familiar from feminist criticisms of pornography. The 
parallel between sexual pornography and generic porn is quite striking in the 
poverty porn case, because poverty porn also focuses on images of people. Here, 
the claim that they both share an objectifying gaze is plausible. But the notion 
of objectification, in its barest form, will not help us with developing an account 
of generic porn—since many of the subjects of such porn are, literally, objects. 
One cannot reduce a closet to an object because it already is an object, and any 
accurate representation of the closet will present it as such. Part of the usage of 
“porn” is to imply that it is a distinctive sort of representation. Not all pictures 
of real estate are real estate porn and not all pictures of closets are closet porn, 
though both porn and non-porn images can correctly present what they depict 
as objects. Thus, the brute notion of objectification will not help us isolate the 
distinctive quality of generic porn or explain why some forms of food photogra-
phy count as food porn while others do not.
More help will come for our particular interests if we turn from the femi-
nist discussion of pornography, with its particular focus on sex, sexuality, and 
human bodies, to the smaller and less traveled discussion of pornography from 
the aesthetics literature.7 Here, the conversation has been one that attempts to 
distinguish between the concept of “pornography” and the concept of “art”—
often focusing on trying to isolate the conceptual difference between an artistic 
nude (perhaps even an erotic one) and pornography. Much of that debate has 
concerned the question of whether the concepts of art and pornography are es-
sentially incompatible. We will remain neutral on that debate for the purposes of 
this paper, but the conceptual territory that has been explored during the debate 
will be useful to us. As Anne Eaton and Hans Maes point out, artistic nudes can 
6 Doucet and Philp, “In Detroit ‘Ruin Porn’ Ignores the Voices of Those Who Still Call the 
City Home.”
7 Andrew Kania has provided a useful discussion of the different themes, framing issues, and 
results across the feminist discussion and the aesthetics discussion (“Concepts of Pornog-
raphy”).
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also be problematically objectifying and misogynistic.8 Thus, the conceptual 
distinction between erotic art and pornography must turn on something over 
and above objectification and misogyny, or at least the distinction must be more 
fine-grained.
One way to make the distinction, according to Maes’s classificatory scheme, 
has been to distinguish pornography in terms of its prescribed response. George 
Steiner argues that pornography leaves nothing up to the imagination, while 
art invites the audience to enter into a jointly creative effort.9 The thought goes 
something like this: art invites all kinds of complex responses. In fact, the free-
dom of our response is part of the value of art, whereas pornography is made 
for, and used for, one particular response. Pornography has a simple and mech-
anistic relationship to its users’ desired response. From this observation, we can 
make a larger point. Pornography has purely instrumental value. It is there to 
provoke a response, and once this has been achieved, we discard it. Art, on the 
other hand, is intrinsically valuable. This is why, suggests Maes, we speak of con-
suming pornography and of appreciating art.
A recent variation on this approach pays special attention to the different 
kinds of relationship between a representation and its medium. With art, we care 
about the way that the content is presented—the technique, the use of the me-
dium—but with pornography, we do not. This approach has many proponents 
and many fine-grained variations, but let us take Christy Mag Uidhir’s analysis 
as our touchstone here.10 Pornography, says Mag Uidhir, is valuable insofar as it 
achieves its purpose of sexual arousal in a “manner-inspecific” way, whereas art is 
valuable insofar as it achieves its purpose in a “manner-specific” way.11 With art, 
we care about all the subtleties of how an artwork achieves its effects—about the 
delicacy of the brushwork, or the interesting framing—whereas with pornogra-
phy, all we care about is the brute fact that we get that desired response. Thus, ac-
cording to Mag Uidhir, even if there is erotic art whose purpose is sexual arousal, 
it differs from pornography in the following way: erotic art is valuable for the 
way in which it produces the sexual arousal—its usage of, say, photographic or 
painterly technique—where pornography is valuable just if it does the job. (Mag 
Uidhir is building from Jerry Levinson’s account, according to which pornogra-
8 Eaton, “A Sensible Antiporn Feminism”; Maes, “Who Says Pornography Can’t Be Art?” 22.
9 Steiner, “Night Words,” 210.
10 For the variations, see see Davies, “Pornography, Art, and the Intended Response of the 
Receiver.”
11 Mag Uidhir, “Why Pornography Can’t Be Art.”
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phy simply presents its content and gets out of the way, whereas, with art, we 
care how that content is presented.)12
Perhaps here it is worth going back as far as Schopenhauer. As Alex Neill 
notes, Schopenhauer contrasts the much-vaunted aesthetic category of the 
sublime with what he calls the merely charming or attractive.13 The charming 
was not a kind of content, but a style or manner for portraying contents. The 
charming cannot be experienced aesthetically, says Schopenhauer, because it is 
designed to excite desire in the beholder, and desire makes impossible the will-
less, contemplative attitude that Schopenhauer takes to be essential to aesthetic 
experience. Strikingly, Schopenhauer picks out two subjects for his disdain—
certain historical manufacturers of nudes who arranged their subjects precisely 
to excite lust, and certain reprehensible Dutch still life paintings of food that 
depicted the food in a manner that “necessarily excite[s] the appetite,” and from 
which the spectator is “positively forced to think of [its] edibility.”14
From both of these threads we can draw some useful lessons for our project. 
In general, what unifies these accounts is a sense that pornography offers some-
thing like a mechanistic or simplistically functional relationship to a representa-
tion. We use that representation to get a particular effect and we value it because 
it reliably gets that effect. And pornography is always contrasted with some other 
representative practice that supports, from certain lights, a fuller and richer rela-
tionship. Non-pornographic artistic representation, by varying accounts, leaves 
our imagination free, lets us be contemplative, or invites contemplation of the 
subtleties of the manner and form of its presentation. Roger Scruton, in fact, 
criticizes pornography, not for failing to be art, but for failing to work toward 
full personal relationships. Pornography gets us only sensations, whereas sexual 
desire, in its most mature and developed form, moves us toward deep interper-
sonal relationships.15
Perhaps one might wish to reject Scruton’s claim that the purpose of sexu-
al desire is always deep interpersonal relationships. Even then, a version of the 
point still holds. Using pornography involves a thinner and less rich interper-
sonal interaction than sex. Using pornography involves no interaction and no 
mutual responsiveness.16 Something about this parallel is surely captured in the 
generic usage of “porn.” Food porn merely stimulates us; it does not bring us 
12 Levinson, “Erotic Art and Pornographic Pictures.”
13 Neill, “The Pornographic, the Erotic, the Charming, and the Sublime,” 49.
14 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, 207–9.
15 Scruton, “The Moral Birds and the Bees.”
16 It is thus unsurprising that it is exactly this lack of mutual responsiveness in sexual cases that 
leads Nagel to classify such cases as “perverse” (“Sexual Perversion”).
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nourishment. Conversely, when my friend enthusiastically texts me pictures of 
the beautiful vaulted ceiling and the warm wooden hallways of the house that 
she has just bought, saying that, for the first time in her life, she feels at home, 
those pictures are most decidedly not real estate porn. Food porn, real estate 
porn, and ruin porn are unified in being shorn of context and consequence—in 
being used to satisfy some desire in a reliable, simple, and functional way. Our 
relationship to porn is sharply and straightforwardly instrumental. This observa-
tion will eventually help us to offer a unified account of why some sorts of porn 
are so troubling, and others are not—and help us to say why. But before we can 
do that, we need to provide a clearer account of what, exactly, porn is.
2. Toward a Definition
We would like, now, to offer a definition of “porn,” in the generic sense. We 
adapt our definition from Michael Rea’s account of pornography.17 We happen 
to think that this is a particularly good account of sexual pornography, but the 
reader need not share that view. What is most important is that Rea’s account 
captures something central to what we have been discussing, and references to 
sexuality and obscenity are not fundamental to the account.
Rea’s account is one that takes the use of pornography by its audience as the 
primary concept. He then treats “pornography” as a secondary concept, defined 
in terms of something’s being used as pornography.
Rea defines use-as-pornography in the following way:
Part 1: x is used (or treated) as pornography by a person S =DF (i) x is a token 
of some sort of communicative material (picture, paragraph, phone call, 
performance, etc.), (ii) S desires to be sexually aroused or gratified by the 
communicative content of x, (iii) if S believes that the communicative 
content of x is intended to foster intimacy between S and the subject(s) 
of x, that belief is not among S’s reasons for attending to x’s content, and 
(iv) if S’s desire to be sexually aroused or gratified by the communicative 
content of x were no longer among S’s reasons for attending to that con-
tent, S would have at most a weak desire to attend to x’s content.18
To gloss this account, a piece of communicative material is used as pornography 
if its user’s primary interest in engaging with that material is sexual arousal or 
gratification. Once the concept of something’s being used as pornography is es-
tablished, Rea defines “pornography” straightforwardly:
17 Rea, “What Is Pornography?”
18 Rea, “What Is Pornography?” 120.
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Part 2: x is pornography =DF it is reasonable to believe that x will be used 
(or treated) as pornography by most of the audience for which it was pro-
duced.19
A virtue of Rea’s account is that it makes sense of the relationship between 
pornography proper and the usage of repurposed pornographic artifacts. For ex-
ample, if hackers break into a film star’s computer, steal some medical pictures, 
and then distribute them for the purposes of sexual gratification, then those pic-
tures are not pornography, but they will be used as pornography. Rea’s condi-
tion (iii) is intended to distinguish between pornography and sexually explicit 
intimate communications between romantic partners. It is, we suggest, a relative 
of Scruton’s thought that pornography is a shallower use of sexual desire than 
are relationships. It also allows us to finely differentiate between pornographic 
and non-pornographic uses of the same material. For example, suppose that one 
sends one’s romantic partner revealing pictures of oneself. If they use those pic-
tures for sexual arousal, but that arousal plays a part in building and furthering 
intimacy, then their use of the pictures is not pornographic on Rea’s account. 
If, however, one’s partner saved those photographs and used them for immedi-
ate gratification after the relationship had ended, then that use would count, on 
Rea’s account, as treating-as-pornography.
We take Rea’s account to be an excellent one from which to build; it will help 
us to crystallize the various associations we charted above. We make the follow-
ing changes to generalize the account. We substitute for the specific notions of 
sexual arousal and sexual gratification the general notion of gratifying reactions. 
A reaction is gratifying when we take some positive enjoyment or pleasure from 
the reaction itself. Furthermore, Rea’s condition (iii) is quite specific to the case 
of sexuality and its role in human relationships. To generalize the underlying 
idea, what seems to unite all the cases of porn is some disengagement from the 
usual complexities, entanglements, difficulties, and responsibilities of the repre-
sented content.
Finally, we shift from the notion of “communicative material” to “represen-
tations” because the notion of a representation is thinner than the notion of 
communicative material and will capture an appropriately wide array of cases. 
For example, if I take a picture with my phone to remember a delicious piece 
of cake for myself, that picture is clearly a representation, but not clearly a piece 
of communicative material. I can surely use that photo as food porn. Similarly, 
suppose I bump my phone and accidentally send a picture of the exquisite meal 
19 Rea, “What Is Pornography?” 120.
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I am enjoying to a friend. That is certainly a representation, but not obviously a 
communication, and it also could be used as food porn.
Thus, following Rea, we define treating-as-porn in the following way:
Treating a representation as Ω-porn =DF using the content of a represen-
tation of Ω primarily for the purpose of generating one’s own gratifying 
reactions, freed from the typically attendant consequences and effort of 
engaging with Ω.
We include “and effort” because there are cases of Ω-porn where the effective-
ness of the porn hinges at least in part on avoiding aspects of the process of en-
gaging with Ω, rather than avoiding the consequences of engaging with Ω.
We then define generic porn in the following way: 
x is Ω-porn =DF x is a representation where it is reasonable to believe that 
x will primarily be used (or treated) as Ω-porn by most of the audience 
for which it was produced or transmitted.
Our account adds to Rea’s the demand that x will primarily be used as Ω-porn. 
This strikes us as a necessary amendment to capture the complexities of the ge-
neric use of the term “porn.” For example, Cezanne’s still-life paintings of fruit 
might primarily be interacted with as art, and secondarily inspire a gratifying 
appetitive response shorn from the entanglements of actually eating. It would 
be strange to call those paintings porn because their status and function as art is 
dominant. Note, however, that it is still open for particular audience members to 
primarily use those paintings as porn, without the paintings actually being porn.
Notice that we have added the notion of “transmission” to Rea’s notion of 
production. This, we think, captures an additional possibility that has become 
particularly salient in the current socio-technological media context. In many 
cases, content aggregators have brought together representations that were not 
originally produced for the sake of being used as porn, but that have been aggre-
gated or retransmitted for the sake of usage as porn. For example, some blogs 
collect particularly luscious real estate photos from sites that posted those pho-
tos for the sake of sale, but where the blogs have collected the most porn-worthy 
shots.
Finally, our account of treating-as-generic-porn drops an equivalent to Rea’s 
condition (iv)—the requirement that if a user’s sexual interest lapsed, the user 
would have little desire to continue to attend to the content. Even if (iv) were 
plausible in cases of sexual pornography, it is highly implausible in important 
cases of generic porn. As Stephanie Patridge notes, we can have multiple rea-
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sons for attending to a representation.20 Enjoyment of sexual representations 
may sometimes overlap with other motivations for attending to these represen-
tations, and individuals may still have non-pornographic reasons for attending 
to a representation in the (counterfactual) absence of the pornographic reasons. 
For example, suppose that we enjoy impeachment porn in large part because of 
the moral importance we attach to problems with the current administration. 
The very importance we attach to these problems likely grounds a reason for us 
to attend to newsfeeds reporting new problems for the administration, indepen-
dent of the gratifying reactions that these reports facilitate. (We suspect that this 
grounding relation is especially common in cases of moral outrage porn, which 
we discuss below.) Notice, however, that even if a piece of news could be used as 
porn, it still might not count as porn, if it were not reasonable to believe that it 
would be so used by most of its intended audience.
After all these complexities, let us also offer a slightly more portable, albeit 
less exact, version of our account:
Portable version: Ω-porn is representations of Ω used for immediate grat-
ification, while avoiding the usual costs and consequences of actually en-
gaging with Ω.21
A nice upshot of our account is that Rea’s notion of pornography turns out to 
be a special case of generic porn, and it satisfies our definition of pornography 
in a way that highlights the parallels between sexual pornography and generic 
porn. On our view, sexual pornography is a representation of sexual content, pri-
marily used for the purpose of a gratifying reaction, freed from the usual effort 
and consequences of sexual interaction.22 Food porn is a representation of food, 
primarily used for the purpose of generating gratifying reactions like pleasurable 
hunger or culinary excitement, freed from the various efforts of making food or 
going to a restaurant, and consequences regarding price and nutrition. (This ex-
plains why food porn is so often a representation of very unhealthy, very expen-
sive, and/or very difficult-to-prepare food.) Real estate porn is a representation 
20 Patridge, “Exclusivism and Evaluation,” 50.
21 Note that this version elides some of the linguistic complexity of the full definition of porn. 
This is meant only as a writerly convenience; we mean throughout to be invoking our full 
definition of porn.
22 Note that our definition demands only that the use-as-porn is in fact (or expects to be) 
freed from the usual effort and consequences, not that the user of porn would prefer to be 
so freed. Somebody using sexual pornography might have preferred to actually have sex and 
be entangled with the costs and consequences, but still counts as using-as-porn because, 
in fact, they have not been so entangled and have no expectation of being so entangled in 
connection with using the pornography.
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of real estate, primarily used for the purpose of generating gratifying reactions, 
freed from the attendant efforts and consequences of purchasing and maintain-
ing real estate. (This explains why real estate porn is so often of a representation 
not only of expensive real estate, but of hard-to-maintain surfaces and materials, 
like all-white upholstery.) Poverty porn is representations of impoverished peo-
ple, primarily used for the purpose of various gratifying reactions—like the plea-
sures of sensations of sentiment and empathy—while freed from the attendant 
effort and consequences of actually having to morally engage with and face the 
prospect of relieving such poverty. (This explains why pictures of impoverished 
people published on charitable donation websites are likely not poverty porn, 
but those same pictures repurposed in a certain sort of travel magazine very like-
ly might be.)
3. Moral Outrage Porn
We have identified what we take to be the concept underlying this new colloquial 
usage. And this new colloquial usage, we think, has come about for a very good 
reason. It picks out a clear, useful, and morally and practically relevant category. 
To demonstrate the account’s conceptual fecundity, we will use it to identify a 
novel form of porn—one that, we hope, will help us to make sense of the world.
We suggest a new category of porn: moral outrage porn. Moral outrage porn 
is representations of moral outrage primarily used for the sake of the resulting 
gratification, where the user engages with the representation freed from the usu-
al consequences and efforts of engaging with morally outrageous content. The 
term “representations of moral outrage” deserves some clarification. There are 
several forms. One is the representation of expressions of moral outrage—such 
as angry tweets expressing moral outrage at some event. Another is the represen-
tation of states of affairs as morally outrageous—such as a morally charged, con-
demnatory description of a political event. We use such representations as moral 
outrage porn when we engage with them primarily for the sake of a gratifying 
reaction, freed from the usual consequences and efforts. Such representations 
are moral outrage porn when it is reasonable to think that they will primari-
ly be put to such uses. Most importantly, using such representations as moral 
outrage porn often involves engaging with them without applying the epistemic 
standards of veracity or worrying about the consequences of entertaining such 
representations.
One might now reasonably begin to suspect that a significant amount of the 
content of social media is, at present, moral outrage porn. A paradigmatic exam-
ple of moral outrage porn is the content of certain politically partisan news sites 
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and social media feeds, which continually present inflammatory articles target-
ing some political enemy. Recall that one of the suggested accounts of sexual 
pornography was that it is used for its capacity to reliably provoke some specific 
effect—as opposed to art, which leaves the audience free to respond in a vari-
ety of ways and is sought out for that very capacity. Levinson suggests, in fact, 
that the very complexities and subtleties that make for artful presentation get in 
the way of the simple, reliable, mechanistic provocation of sexual responses of 
pornography. When we want porn, we do not want artfulness. We just want for 
pornography to do its job and then get out of the way.23 We can find a similar 
phenomenon with moral outrage porn. When one interacts with the news in a 
non-porn way, one looks for the facts, in their full complexity, and engages with 
them as purportedly true statements about the world. This sort of interaction 
leaves the door open for one to encounter unsettling ideas—unexpected evi-
dence, challenging considerations. On the other hand, when one uses the news 
as moral outrage porn, one comes to it hoping, consciously or subconsciously, 
that it will reliably provide the gratifications associated with moral outrage.24 
This would likely lead one to be largely disinterested in complex presentations 
of morally ambiguous situations, because that would interfere with getting reli-
ably to that gratifying moral outrage. Such a user of moral outrage porn would, 
then, seek out reliable sources of simplistic and predictable moral descriptions 
of the world.25 They would avoid morally rich representations, which might lead 
to complex and unpredictable emotional and intellectual responses.
What makes something moral outrage porn then is the interest in using mo-
rality for gratification on the part of its users. A news item may indeed invite 
moral outrage, but insofar as we reach that moral outrage through a full-blood-
ed and nuanced moral engagement—insofar as we are seeking moral truth and 
not using our morality reactions for pleasure—then we are not using it as moral 
outrage porn.
Notice, too, that our definition of “porn” includes things that are transmitted, 
and not necessarily produced, for the sake of treatment as porn. Think about 
23 Levinson, “Erotic Art and Pornographic Pictures,” 232–33.
24 See empirical work by Green et al. suggesting a tendency for individuals to want to read 
moral-outrage-inducing articles in order to feel good about themselves (“Self-Enhancement, 
Righteous Anger, and Moral Grandiosity”). Also see Pizarro and Baumeister, “Superhero 
Comics as Moral Pornography,” for a discussion of the gratification of moral judgment and 
categorization; as well as Rothschild and Keefer, “A Cleansing Fire,” for evidence suggesting 
that expressing moral outrage can be effective in reducing feelings of personal guilt.
25 For an excellent discussion of superhero comics as a specific example of such moral simpli-
fication for enjoyment purposes, see Pizarro and Baumeister, “Superhero Comics as Moral 
Pornography,” 29–31.
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moral outrage porn newsfeeds, which pick stories from more informational-
ly and morally rich resources. For example, a highly partisan newsfeed could 
simply repost news from more neutral news sites, but cherry-pick the most in-
flammatory stories. That cherry-picked feed creates moral outrage porn through 
contextual aggregation. It might be that no particular news item on such a biased 
feed is moral outrage porn on its own, but the filtered, preselected assemblage 
may compositely be moral outrage porn.26
4. Dangers of Moral Outrage Porn
Though porn, in the generic sense, is not necessarily dangerous or morally prob-
lematic, we think that moral outrage porn, in particular, is problematic. First, the 
use of moral outrage porn is a form of epistemic bad faith. If we adopt beliefs 
simply or primarily for the sake of their pleasurable resulting outrage, rather 
than for their putative veracity, then this is clearly a violation of any number of 
plausible epistemic standards. Second, in many cases when we indulge in using 
moral outrage porn, we are not adopting any new beliefs, but are instead using 
the moral values that we already have for the sake of generating personal gratifi-
cation. We will argue that this, too, is a highly suspect and problematic practice.
First, we propose a distinction between two sorts of porn: mechanistic porn 
and cognitive porn. In mechanistic porn, one achieves gratification from experi-
encing a representation without needing to take on any specific beliefs regarding 
the representation’s truthfulness or accuracy. We take food porn to be an almost 
entirely mechanistic form of porn; much sexual pornography is similarly mech-
anistic.27 In order to be gratified by cognitive porn, however, one must seriously 
entertain the legitimacy of some belief relevant to the represented content. In 
the case of moral outrage porn, one must usually seriously entertain some moral 
belief arising from the represented content, or seriously entertain some moral 
belief that applies to the represented content.28
26 This raises the possibility of algorithmically generated moral outrage porn, in which auto-
matic filtering effects from technological agents like Google Search algorithmically generate 
resources which it is reasonable to believe that its audience will use as porn. See Pariser, The 
Filter Bubble; Miller and Record, “Justified Belief in a Digital Age”; Watson, “Filter Bubbles 
and the Public Use of Reason”; and Nguyen, “Echo Chambers and Epistemic Bubbles.” Fur-
thermore, if it is not already clear, we think that there is moral outrage porn aplenty across 
the political spectrum.
27 We accept, however, that at least some sexual pornography is (at least to a significant degree) 
cognitive.
28 Consider, also, the recent coinage of the term “justice porn,” which is representations of 
wrongdoers getting their immediate, and often violent, comeuppance. Justice porn is almost 
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Let us start with a paradigmatic case of moral outrage porn: a website whose 
readership is entirely of political party A posts detestable quotations from polit-
ical leaders of political party B, where that readership is primarily interested in 
using those quotations for the sake of pleasurably stoking their moral outrage. In 
the usual case, there are two components: (i) a particular judgment concerning 
the represented incident, which is grounded in (ii) some moral value that read-
ers accept. Intuitively, there seems to be something quite wrong with the use of 
moral outrage porn in this case. It seems like we are not so much inhabiting our 
moral beliefs as we are taking advantage of them for self-gratification.
But what, really, is the problem with that? It cannot just be that one is not 
taking one’s moral beliefs sufficiently seriously. In fact, one typically needs to 
have a certain degree of moral belief and commitment in order to attain the de-
sired gratifications. Holding one’s moral beliefs with unswerving seriousness 
and commitment can actually make it easier to achieve the various gratifications 
of emotional security, clarity, comfort, and superiority.
Let us start by considering the epistemic problems involved with using moral 
outrage porn. There are two possibilities here. First, the user of moral outrage 
porn could be adopting a new moral view in order to be gratified. Second, the 
user could be gratified by the exercise of a moral view they already accept. Either 
case is problematic.
Suppose one adopts a new moral view simply in order to be gratified. The 
problem here is clear: one is adopting a belief or set of beliefs for non-epistemic 
reasons.29 The reasons of gratification urge one toward a different set of moral 
beliefs than the reasons of moral veracity. Imagine, for the moment, that one 
set out to develop a set of moral beliefs so as to maximize one’s possibility for 
pleasing moral outrage. The moral system one would develop would likely be 
clear, strident, and demanding, so as to maximize the incidence of moral outrage. 
It would likely admit of few ambiguities or difficulties, for the purpose of max-
imizing the possibility of clear, undiluted outrage and its associated pleasures. 
This sort of procedure obviously violates any number of epistemic norms and 
certainly another example of cognitive porn. In order to enjoy the representation of (say) 
a just punishment as just, it is plausible that one must accept, at least while enjoying the 
representation, that the retribution was justified. Thus, insofar as a representation is used as 
justice porn, the user must have, or at least entertain, a relevant belief. It may be that justice 
porn, in the sense indicated here, is actually a subset of moral outrage porn. We need not 
take a position on this issue, but if justice porn is simply an example of moral outrage porn, 
this fits nicely with the plausibility of the view that both moral outrage porn and justice 
porn are prime examples of cognitive porn.
29 Regarding using the “wrong kinds of reasons,” see Hieronymi, “The Wrong Kind of Reason.”
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virtues.30 And notice that this sort of unambiguous, strident morality does seem 
to be precisely the kind of moral system we often find in communities given to 
the endemic usage of moral outrage porn.
What, then, of those moral outrages that depend on one’s antecedently ac-
cepted moral views? We already hold certain moral beliefs, and it is so tempting 
to indulge in those websites that hold up the enemies of our antecedent beliefs 
for outrage and disdain. There are two major problems with this behavior pat-
tern. First, in most cases, independent confirmation is a good reason to increase 
our degree of belief. When we systematically seek out moral outrage porn, we 
are getting extra confirmations of our moral worldview. That confirmation works 
in several ways. One way relies on the fact that moral outrage porn can itself 
contain moral content. That is, much moral outrage porn does not simply repre-
sent some state of affairs neutrally, to which we apply our own moral beliefs—it 
instead presents the world already colored by moral judgment. Thus, it presents 
itself as a form of support for our moral beliefs. But when one is engaged with 
moral outrage porn, one is seeking out representations of moral outrage for the 
sake of the resulting gratification, and so one is incentivized to preselect those 
representations with which one agrees. This invites a problematic form of circu-
larity—where one picks one’s sources based on agreement with one’s anteced-
ent beliefs, and then goes on to use those sources to buttress one’s antecedent 
beliefs.31 Thus, the moral outrage porn user is tempted, through the logic of 
self-gratification, into epistemic relationships that can increase their degree of 
moral self-confidence without adequate epistemic justification.
Second, moral outrage porn may misrepresent empirical facts about the 
world in order to provoke more gratifying moral outrage. This may happen by 
simply presenting false “facts,” or by cherry-picking outraging facts. For exam-
ple, a moral outrage porn news site could easily operate simply by selectively 
picking out the most damning and awful single sentences said by members of 
some opponent political party. Such cherry-picking offers an easier and more 
reliable pathway to the gratifications of moral outrage than would a more com-
plete presentation of the relevant facts. Thus, such a site would misrepresent the 
30 We are assuming, for the sake of this paper, the kinds of epistemic norms that demand that 
beliefs arise from the evidence, as guided by the aims of truth (Hieronymi, “The Wrong 
Kind of Reason”). We suspect that most pragmatist accounts of epistemic norms would also 
yield norms forbidding this sort of bad faith belief, on long-term pragmatic grounds, but 
that issue is beyond the scope of this paper.
31 For a discussion of how moral agreement and disagreement are epistemically relevant to 
moral beliefs, please see Nguyen, “Autonomy, Understanding, and Moral Disagreement.” 
For further discussion about the social circularity described here, see Nguyen, “Cognitive 
Islands and Runaway Echo Chambers” and “Echo Chambers and Epistemic Bubbles.”
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opponent party as a means of gratifying its audience. And the user of moral out-
rage porn, insofar as they seek that particular form of gratification, should prefer 
such poorer-quality sources of information to more accurate, but less gratifying, 
sources.
So far, we have been discussing nonfictional cases, which are the clearest 
cases of problematic moral outrage porn. They represent purportedly real sit-
uations, and consequently engage one’s genuine moral beliefs and/or morally 
relevant empirical beliefs. But what about fictional cases? Surely we could have 
representations of moral outrage in fiction, and surely we could engage with fic-
tion specifically for the gratifications of such representations. What could possi-
bly be wrong with that?
First, it is important to note that we may not be able to actually adopt fic-
tional moral attitudes. As the recent literature on imaginative resistance tells us, 
there seems to be a striking difference between moral beliefs and other beliefs 
in fiction.32 We can easily imagine ourselves into a fictional world in which ships 
travel faster than light or the Nazis won World War II. But we cannot easily imag-
ine ourselves into a fictional world where the Nazis’ anti-Semitism was morally 
correct or where killing innocents for sport is morally praiseworthy. This means 
that fictional moral outrage porn will have the following character: it will pres-
ent us with fictional situations with which we engage on the basis of our actual 
moral beliefs. Again, one might ask, what’s wrong with that? After all, we will not 
be changing our consumption of facts in the world, so we will not be engaged in 
epistemic bad faith.
The worry about strategically shifting one’s moral beliefs to maximize outrage, 
however, remains. We engage with morally outraging fiction as non-porn when 
we are appropriately entangled with its moral content—when we ask ourselves 
if its moral vision is true, and, if it is, try to integrate that vision into our belief 
system. We engage with morally outraging fiction as porn when we take gratifi-
cation from our reaction of moral outrage, while avoiding the further entangle-
ments of applying and integrating our larger epistemic and moral beliefs with an 
eye toward the truth.33 Furthermore, if a certain moral system is desirable, not 
because it is accurate but because it maximizes the pleasures of moral outrage, 
then that desirability will show up both in the fictional and the nonfictional cas-
32 Gendler, “The Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance.”
33 We are not assuming here that the only content of fiction is moral content. For example, it 
seems to us that one can engage with fiction’s artistic content in a way that is richly entan-
gled with aesthetic and artistic engagement, or one can avoid such engagement, as Mag 
Uidhir and Levinson suggest.
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es. When this happens, the use of fictional moral outrage porn can incentivize us 
to acquire moral beliefs for the wrong reasons.
5. The Moral Status of Moral Outrage Porn
We have argued that the use of moral outrage porn is often epistemically prob-
lematic. It seems to us, however, that using moral outrage porn might also be 
morally problematic. In this section, we will sketch some possible frameworks 
for thinking about the moral problems of moral outrage porn. While we do not 
take ourselves to be presenting complete arguments here, we find these lines of 
inquiry plausible and worthy of further development.
First, reconsider the epistemic connection. As we noted, in the vast majority 
of cases of the use of moral outrage porn, an individual will seek out represen-
tations that are pleasurable because of that individual’s antecedent moral views, 
thereby acquiring what is easily mistaken for further confirmation of these views. 
This is certainly problematic in the epistemic sense. But epistemic carelessness 
is not, in itself, always morally problematic. (For example, suppose that we 
form our belief about whether tomatoes are fruits or vegetables by consulting 
our Magic 8 Ball. This is bad reasoning, epistemically speaking, but not morally 
wrong.)
It is plausible, however, that epistemic carelessness specifically in the mor-
al realm is morally problematic. Insofar as one’s moral convictions are likely to 
inform how one behaves in morally relevant settings, epistemic carelessness in 
the moral realm exposes one to acting in morally wrongful ways. Increasing the 
likelihood that one will act wrongfully is clearly morally problematic for conse-
quentialist reasons, and epistemic carelessness in the moral realm may also be 
morally problematic simply in virtue of expressing a lack of respect for moral 
reasoning.34 Thus, because the use of moral outrage porn seriously risks viola-
tions of acceptable morally relevant belief formation, it is morally problematic.
Additionally, the use of moral outrage porn faces another, distinctively moral 
problem—one that is entirely independent of epistemic considerations. In dis-
cussions of moral outrage porn, we have noticed a common attitude, vaguely 
expressed as the concern that using moral outrage porn misuses morality—that 
such use “isn’t what morality is for.” This intuitive sense of wrongness, we think, 
34 For our current purposes, it is enough that there is at least one serious moral strike against 
such epistemic carelessness. In an in-progress paper, however, Bekka Williams argues that 
nontrivial epistemic carelessness in the moral realm is morally wrong regardless of its con-
sequences.
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points the way to the distinctively moral problem. The use of moral outrage porn 
cheapens and undermines the role of moral experience.
This worry parallels, in some significant ways, Tosi and Warmke’s complaint 
against moral grandstanding.35 Moral grandstanding is morally problematic, 
they argue, in large part because grandstanders are treating moral discourse as 
a “vanity project”:
In using public moral discourse to promote an image of themselves to 
others, grandstanders turn their contributions to moral discourse into a 
vanity project. Consider the incongruity between, say, the moral gravity 
of a world-historic injustice, on the one hand, and a group of acquain-
tances competing for the position of being most morally offended by it, 
on the other.
Such behavior, we think, is not the sort of thing we should expect 
from a virtuous person.36
Note, crucially, that the problem asserted by Tosi and Warmke in this instance is 
not that moral grandstanding has bad results.37 Instead, the problem is that using 
moral discourse for self-promotion is problematically egotistical.
Tosi and Warmke focus on moral problems associated with using moral 
outrage for interpersonal jockeying. That is the essence of the notion of mor-
al grandstanding—the use of moral expression for social signaling. Similarly, it 
seems plausible that the use of moral outrage porn in many cases involves a fail-
ure to respect the fundamental role of moral expression. Notice that, where the 
problem with moral grandstanding is essentially interpersonal and social, the 
problem with moral outrage porn is personal and hedonistic.38 The problem of 
moral grandstanding is that we use morality for status; the problem of moral 
outrage porn is that we are using morality for pleasure. When one indulges in 
moral outrage porn, one uses what by one’s own lights is morally outrageous for 
35 As described by Tosi and Warmke, moral grandstanding involves expressing a moral view, 
attitude, etc., where the expression is significantly motivated by a desire to be recognized as 
“morally respectable” (“Moral Grandstanding,” 200, 202).
36 Tosi and Warmke, “Moral Grandstanding,” 215–16.
37 Although they also claim that moral grandstanding often has bad results.
38 For empirical evidence that experience of moral outrage serves to reduce the experience 
of individual guilt, see Rothschild and Keefer, “A Cleansing Fire”; and Rothschild et al., “A 
Dual-Motive Model of Scapegoating.” For empirical evidence that individuals sometimes 
engage with moral-outrage-inducing articles in order to bolster their self-perceptions as 
morally virtuous (as “paragons of morality”), see Green et al., “Self-Enhancement, Righ-
teous Anger, and Moral Grandiosity.”
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one’s own enjoyment.39 It is, loosely speaking, to make morality about oneself, 
when it clearly is not.
Furthermore, it is no accident, we think, that the features of moral outrage 
porn relevant to the “bad faith” problem mirror Michael Tanner’s account of 
the problems of sentimentality.40 In his discussion of Oscar Wilde and the sen-
timental, Tanner says, “the feelings which constitute [the sentimental] are in 
some important way unearned, being had on the cheap, come by too easily.”41 
The use of moral outrage porn, if one accepts our definition, involves an attempt 
to be gratified by a representation of the end result of moral engagement without 
taking on the consequences or effort of actually engaging. This seems a paradig-
matic case of getting a feeling on the cheap.
What we have sketched thus far are a number of considerations that weigh in 
favor of a serious moral strike against the use of moral outrage porn. There are 
also a number of consequentialist considerations that we might adduce. Tanner 
argues that the intrinsically sentimental tends toward passivity.42 Sentimental 
emotions, Tanner suggests, can themselves encourage inaction.
It also seems to me that some of my feelings are of a kind that inhibit 
action, because they themselves are enjoyable to have, but if acted upon, 
one would cease to have them, and one doesn’t want to. Such a feeling 
does seem to me intrinsically sentimental.43
Just as sexual pornography can—although certainly need not—problemat-
ically replace real interpersonal sexual interaction, moral outrage porn runs the 
risk of mollifying its users into inaction.44 Along similarly problematic lines, use 
of moral outrage porn could have the effect that Tosi and Warmke term “out-
rage exhaustion”—that is, those who regularly use moral outrage porn may, as 
Tosi and Warmke suggest, “find it increasingly difficult to muster outrage when 
it actually is appropriate.”45 But these final suggestions would require significant 
empirical investigation to substantiate.
39 See especially our above discussion of the difficulty (if not impossibility) of enjoying an 
instance of moral outrage porn without at least entertaining a relevant moral belief.
40 Tanner, “Sentimentality.”
41 Tanner, “Sentimentality,” 128.
42 Tanner, “Sentimentality,” 134.
43 Tanner, “Sentimentality,” 139.
44 See especially empirical findings by Rothschild and Keefer (“A Cleansing Fire”) suggest-
ing that the expression of moral outrage tends to decrease the experience of personal guilt, 
which thus tends to decrease motivation to act to remedy injustice.
45 Tosi and Warmke, “Moral Grandstanding,” 211.
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6. Porn as Instrumentalizing
This analysis of moral outrage porn suggests a larger account of the moral sta-
tus of porn in general. Our comments here will necessarily be a bit preliminary, 
since we are grappling with a large and diverse array of phenomena.
As we noted earlier, users are looking for pornography to provoke a mecha-
nistic and simplistic response in them—unlike the complex, unpredictable, and 
rich responses we seek with art. That mechanistic attitude reveals something 
deeper: an instrumental attitude toward the pornography. This instrumental-
ization seems problematic in two ways. Insofar as art is intrinsically valuable, 
then pornography cannot be art, because our attitude toward it is strictly instru-
mental. And insofar as the frequent use of pornography encourages a strictly 
instrumental attitude toward actual people and sexual encounters, then it helps 
to undermine our capacity to treat humans and intimate human relationships 
with the dignity they deserve.
Moral outrage porn also involves various forms of problematic instrumen-
talization. First, with moral outrage porn, we are instrumentalizing the porn’s 
content—though not through the kind of mechanistic pathway of sexual por-
nography. Insofar as I am interacting with the news as moral outrage porn, I am 
not looking to be informed by the facts, but am using the news for the sake of 
my own gratification. So long as we are supposed to be responsive to the genuine 
facts of the matter, using the news as moral outrage porn—and manipulating 
which facts I am exposed to, for the sake of gratification—is a violation of epis-
temic norms. Furthermore, the regular use of moral outrage porn encourages 
a further form of instrumentalization—one in which we instrumentalize our 
own moral beliefs. Moral outrage porn gives me an incentive to modify my own 
moral beliefs: I can be tempted to modify my beliefs to make it easier to access 
the gratifications of moral outrage. But that modification is an abuse of moral 
belief—so long as we think that moral beliefs are supposed to track something 
like moral truth.
This suggests a general account of the moral status of porn. Using porn in-
volves making an instrumental use of a representation. Furthermore, using porn 
often encourages further instrumentalizations of the represented content.46 Fi-
nally, using porn often encourages even more downstream instrumentalizations 
of various background beliefs and attitudes. For example: using sexual pornog-
46 Consider especially Green et al.’s evidence that those who have been manipulated to expe-
rience moral outrage (“righteous anger”) had an increased likelihood of desiring to engage 
with moral-outrage-inducing articles (“Self-Enhancement, Righteous Anger, and Moral 
Grandiosity”).
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raphy certainly instrumentalizes representations of sex and bodies, may encour-
age the instrumentalization of sex and bodies themselves, and may encourage 
the instrumentalization of downstream associates, such as relationships and 
personalities.47 Using the news as moral outrage porn certainly instrumentalizes 
the news, likely instrumentalizes the events in the world, and furthermore may 
encourage the instrumentalization of our moral beliefs and moral communities.
This helps us explain the variation in our attitudes toward the moral status 
of different kinds of porn. Other things being equal, the use of porn is morally 
problematic when such instrumentalizations run afoul of other norms (some of 
which we have discussed), and unproblematic when such instrumentalizations 
are themselves unproblematic. This offers a useful explanation for our asymmet-
ric intuitions about the various forms of porn. Using food porn and real estate 
porn seems unproblematic. Our account suggests that this is because there is 
nothing wrong with instrumentalizing food or real estate or their representa-
tions. Sexual pornography and moral outrage porn strike many as problematic. 
Our account suggests an explanation: they are problematic insofar as they en-
courage the instrumentalization of things that ought not to be instrumentalized.
To be absolutely clear: our account is in no way intended to be a criticism 
of moral outrage, or some sort of general call for politeness and civility. Moral 
outrage can be crucial to proper moral action and the quest for social justice. 
Our worry is, in fact, something of the opposite: our worry is that using moral 
outrage porn can dilute genuine moral outrage or lead it astray. It is precisely 
because moral outrage is so important that we must not instrumentalize it. We 
certainly should not retune our sense of outrage for our own pleasure.
It might be useful here to note that there can certainly also be “civility porn”: 
calls for civility and politeness, used for the sake of pleasurable feelings of, say, 
smugness and superiority at one’s own maturity and high-mindedness.48 The 
problem is not with moral outrage or civility themselves; it is with instrumen-
talizing the representations of either. Both moral outrage and civility are vital, 
which is exactly why moral outrage porn and civility porn are so potentially un-
dermining.
7. Conclusion
We think that our definition captures, to a significant degree of accuracy, the 
natural usage of the term porn in the generic sense. It describes the regular way in 
47 For a sophisticated discussion of the potential harms of sexual pornography, see Eaton, “A 
Sensible Antiporn Feminism.”
48 We owe this idea to a suggestion by Aaron Rabinowitz.
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which the term has come to be used and understood in recent discussions, and it 
naturally categorizes sexual pornography as an instance of generic porn—which 
is both plausible on its face and helpful in explaining the genesis of the generic 
usage. Furthermore, our account of generic porn is useful in that it highlights 
and provides a framework for discussing a widespread and rapidly increasing 
phenomenon: moral outrage porn. The use of moral outrage porn, we have ar-
gued, is epistemically problematic. It may also be morally problematic. It is plau-
sibly objectionable in the way that cheapens and undermines moral experience. 
Moral outrage porn invites us to instrumentalize something that ought not to be 
instrumentalized.
We have tried to unpack the conceptual insight contained in a recent, natu-
rally evolved sort of neologism. The term “porn” once had a clear and restrict-
ed meaning, concerning certain sexual representations. That term has recently 
gained a new, secondary colloquial usage—the generic usage of “porn.” That 
usage may have started as a metaphor or a joke. But the reason that this second-
ary usage has caught on so well is because it identifies a common thread in our 
usage of representations—that sometimes we use representations for self-grati-
fication, freed from the usually attendant consequences and worries that might 
accompany actual interactions with what was represented. That kind of usage is 
starkly obvious in the sexual cases, but thinking seriously about the use of sexual 
pornography, as we have argued, provides a very useful framework for under-
standing the new and widespread use of the term “porn” in the generic sense.49
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